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Abstract. Relying on University of Michigan data on consumersination expec-
tations, we establish some stylized facts on the process of ination expectation formation
across di¤erent demographic groups. Percentile time series models are employed to test
for rationality and to study learning dynamics across the whole cross-sectional spectrum of
responses. These display a signicant degree of heterogeneity and asymmetry. Income, ed-
ucation, and gender seem to be rather important characteristics when forecasting ination.
In particular, high income, highly educated, and male agents produce lower mean squared
errors. Moreover, socioeconomically "disadvantaged" respondents assume as a reference
point their specic consumption basket, while more advantaged respondents actually ob-
serve the general price level. A common observation applying to all socioeconomic groups is
that agents positioned around the center of the distribution behave roughly in line with the
rational expectations hypothesis. Agents on the left hand side of the median (LHS) of the
distribution update information very infrequently. As to agents on the right hand side of the
median (RHS), we can a¢ rm that their expectations are consistent with adaptive learning
and staggered information updating. However, the speed of learning can vary signicantly
across percentiles and di¤erent demographic groups.
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2Introduction
Anchoring ination expectations is of crucial importance for the conduct of monetary policy.
Central banks have, as a primary task, the pursuit of price stability. The e¤ectiveness of
their action crucially depends on they way individuals perceive the course of monetary policy
and future economic developments. Economists typically assume that agents possess perfect
knowledge of the statistical properties of the variables they wish to forecast. Nevertheless,
heterogeneity is pervasive in economic systems. Agents do not predict on the basis of the same
information set, do not entail the same capacity to process information and do not employ
the same model. As a matter of fact, when people rely on their beliefs, and engage in out-of-
equilibrium learning or update their information sets asynchronously, heterogeneity and self-
referentiality might determine a broad set of paths of the economy. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance to observe and understand di¤erent sources of heterogeneity and asymmetry in the
process of ination expectation formation.
Relying on University of Michigan Survey data on householdsination expectations, this
paper assesses the inuence of agentssocioeconomic background on their forecasts. We evaluate
the signicance of di¤erent theoretical models of expectation formation and explore asymmetries
across demographic groups. Our analysis is centered around recent contributions advanced in
the theoretical literature. Some of these models postulate the existence of informational frictions
or conjecture that agents might act as econometricians when forecasting. The latter approach,
widely known as adaptive learning, is thoroughly discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
while the former is usually labelled as rational inattentiveness, according to Sims (2003, 2006).
Hicks (1939) has propounded expectations as one of the main drivers of economic dynamics.
He can also be regarded as one of the rst economists interested in the fundamental process of
ination expectations formation:
It seems possible to classify three sorts of inuences to which price-expectations
may be subject. One sort is entirely non-economic: the weather, the political news,
peoples state of health their psychology. Another is economic, but still not closely
connected with actual price movements; it will include mere market superstitions,
at the one extreme, and news bearing on future movements of demand or supply
(e.g., crop reports), at the other. The third consists of actual experience of prices,
experience in the past and experience in the present; it is this last about what we
can nd most to say. (p. 204)
Throughout the history of economic thought expectations have been in the heart of the
economic literature. Several theoretical contributions have been advanced to explain the fun-
damental process of expectation formation. Nevertheless, only few studies have focused on the
empirical assessment of these frameworks. Despite the increasing availability of survey data,
the empirical literature has generally disregarded the possibility to exploit the cross-sectional
information available in these datasets and the opportunity to pursue a joint assessment of
competing models of expectation formation.
3As Hicks (1939) has pointed out, economists know very little about how agents form their
expectations in the real world. Lately, a consensus has emerged on the view that agents form
their expectations heterogeneously. The literature on heterogeneous expectations tends to clas-
sify three main sources of heterogeneity. Heterogeneous forecasts might be a consequence of: (i)
employing di¤erent models;1 (ii) di¤erent information sets; (iii) di¤erent capacities to process
information. Contrary to previous contributions, this paper allows us to shed light also on
the non-economic roots of heterogeneity advanced by Hicks (1939). Strictly speaking, socioe-
conomic characteristics are associated to the second and third source of heterogeneity. Agents
with di¤erent socioeconomic backgrounds are likely to entail di¤erent degrees of access to the
relevant information. Possibly, they also have di¤erent capacities to process information.
Moreover, socioeconomic indicators might constitute a reliable proxy to assess the impor-
tance of nancial constraints. As gathering information is costly, some agents might be con-
strained to rely on less sophisticated methods of forecasting. The literature on rationally hetero-
geneous expectations explores this issue. The problem is treated from an utility maximization
point of view, where agents choose between di¤erent competing models of expectation forma-
tion. Brock and Hommes (1997), Branch and McGough (2007) and Pfajfar (2007) analyze
alternative switching mechanisms within a cobweb framework. In particular, Pfajfar (2007)
stresses the importance of the capacity to process information. We argue that this factor can
be importantly inuenced by demographic characteristics.
As far as the empirical literature is concerned, the introduction of rationality tests and the
empirical validation of models of adaptive expectations (see, e.g., Pesaran, 1985, 1987) have
represented the only contributions in the last two decades. Only recently, the literature has
been enriched by an empirical investigation of the degree of heterogeneity (Branch, 2004, 2007)
and information stickiness (Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2004 and Carroll, 2003a, 2003b). Fur-
thermore, some empirical support has been provided for macroeconomic models implementing
learning dynamics.2
Few studies have pointed out the signicance of socioeconomic factors for the expectation
formation process.3 Jonung (1981) shows that female ination forecasts are less accurate than
those of their male counterparts (see also Bryan and Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b). As women are
usually responsible for day-to-day food purchase, Jonung (1981) suggests that this bias is due
to relatively larger rises in food prices compared to the general consumer price index (CPI).
We further investigate on this argument in Section 4. To the best of our knowledge, only three
other studies partly look at ination expectations across di¤erent demographic groups. Maital
and Maital (1981) implement some tests for rationality, both on individual and group-specic
expectations about the average level of ination.4 They conclude that socioeconomic variables
1Namely, agents could have di¤erent underlying assumptions about the structure of the economy or di¤erent
parameterisation (or priors) of the same model.
2See Milani (2007) and Orphanides and Williams (2003, 2005a, 2005b) who rst advanced some empirical
support for learning dynamics.
3Dominitz and Manski (2005) analyse heterogeneity of expectations about equity prices. They also present
some evidence about heterogeneity across demographic groups. They nd that young agents, males and more
educated tend to be more optimistic compared to their counterparts.
4Expectations regarding di¤erent socioeconomic groups are obtained from the Current Survey of the Israel
4such as age, trust and income exert a strong inuence on the expectation formation process.
Palmqvist and Strömberg (2004) show that ination opinions in Sweden are lower among male,
more-educated and high income respondents. Lindén (2004) reaches analogous conclusions when
comparing perceived and expected ination in the Euro area. Granato, Lo, and Wong (2004)
detect a boomerang e¤ect in the ination di¤usion process across di¤erent educational groups.
They argue that, due to misinterpretation occurring in the phase of information acquisition,
less informed agentsforecasts tend to confound those of more informed agents.
In this paper we rely on monthly micro data on ination expectations provided by the
University of Michigan Survey Research Center. As the pseudo panel employed is highly unbal-
anced, we compute percentiles of the empirical distribution in each period. Therefore, we obtain
monthly time series for each percentile, which carry information on individuals comprised in
di¤erent parts of the empirical density.
Compared to previous studies, where tests of rationality are only applied to measures of
central tendency, this paper extends these testing procedures to the whole cross-sectional spec-
trum of responses. We nd that the null hypothesis of rationality cannot be rejected just for few
percentiles centered around or slightly above the median. We also estimate several additional
time series models of expectation formation. These conrm a signicant degree of asymmetry
in the expectation formation process across demographic groups. Income, gender and education
seem to be particularly important characteristics when forecasting ination. In particular, high
income, male, and highly educated agents produce lower mean squared errors.
These conclusions cannot abstract from considering that di¤erent demographic groups are
likely to be exposed to di¤erent CPI inations. As a matter of fact, the representative consump-
tion basket can signicantly di¤er across demographic groups. We assess the importance of this
factor for the observed degree of heterogeneity, by employing the dataset of McGranahan and
Paulson (2005) reporting CPIs for each demographic group. We also compare the forecasting
performance of di¤erent groups with respect to the general and group-specic ination, showing
that the latter constitutes a reference point for the forecast process of socioeconomically less
advantaged groups.
Overall, agents positioned around the center of the distribution roughly behave in line with
the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis.5 However, our results suggest that respondents on
the left hand side of the median (LHS) generally display an autoregressive behavior. Further-
more, ination expectations formed by these LHS agents display a consistent degree of digit
preference. Often these respondents do not observe any of the relevant macroeconomic vari-
ables. Conversely, agents on the right hand side of the median (RHS) are generally proven to
be too pessimistic and usually tend to overpredict actual ination. Their ination expectations
are more consistent with adaptive behavior (learning), although their speed of learning can vary
considerably. Furthermore, we argue that they exhibit some inherent features pointed out by
recent advances in the macroeconomic and nancial literature on rational inattentiveness and
Institute for Applied Social Research.
5For more detailed results, see Pfajfar and Santoro (2007).
5rationally heterogeneous expectations models.6 We must bear in mind that the cost of being
inattentive increases as ination increases.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows: Section 1 reports in more detail the dataset
employed; Section 2 delivers some preliminary descriptive statistics; Section 3 discusses the
relative importance of di¤erent perceived inations for each demographic group; Section 4 fo-
cuses on the percentile time series analysis, with a special attention for learning dynamics and
information stickiness; last section concludes and gives some suggestions for further research.
1. The Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior
The Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, conducted by the Survey Research Center
(SRC) at the University of Michigan, has been available on a monthly basis since January 1978.
The survey comprises an average of 591 households, with a peak of 1479 in November 1978
and a minimum of 492 in November 1992. From January 1987 onward it reports an average of
approximately 500 responses. Following a rst interview, each respondent is reinterviewed after
six months. The sampling method is designed in a way that, in any given month, approximately
45% of prior respondents is reinterviewed, while the remaining 55% are new households. There
are two relevant questions about price level changes: (i) rst, households are asked whether
they expect prices to go up, down or to stay the same in the next 12 months; (ii) second, they
are asked to provide a quantitative answer about the expected change.7
Rather than reporting the actual forecasts, available data are summarized in intervals (e.g.
"go down", "stay the same or down", go up by 1-2%, 3-4%, 5%, 6-9%, 10-14%, 15+%). There
might be some confusion about the category "stay the same or down". In the remainder of the
paper we follow Curtin (1996) and treat this response as 0. A word of caution is in order for
households that expect prices to go up, without providing any quantitative statement. In this
case, we redistribute their response across the six ranges of price change, depending on their
relative share. We exclude an extremely small proportion of "do not know" responses from our
sample.
As agents report unbounded ination forecasts, we need to determine points at both ends
of the distribution beyond which observations should be excluded.8 Curtin (1996) suggests
two alternative truncations, namely at -10% and +50% and at -5% and +30%. Overall, there
seems to be poor evidence supporting the choice of one truncation rule over the other. In the
remainder of the paper we rely on the second truncation rule.
6 Inattentiveness agents who update their information sets only occasionally has been advanced by Sims
(2003, 2006) and rst implemented in the macroeconomic model by Mankiw and Reis (2002). The theory of
rationally heterogeneous expectations has been put forward by Brock and Hommes (1997). Their basic argument
is that it might not always be optimal from a utility maximisation point of view to use a costly-sophisticated
predictor that produces lower mean squared error. Thus, some agents might be better o¤ with a slightly worse
predictor, which is less costly to use.
7 In case any respondent expects prices to stay the same, the interviewer must make sure that the respondent
does not have in mind that prices will keep changing at the current rate of growth.
8 It is important to recall that the exact specication of the truncation rule only inuences the mean and the
variance of the distribution, but has no e¤ect on the median. It is also relevant to take into account that the
upper tail of the distribution is not only long but also sparse, frequently with large gaps between observations.
Technical considerations regarding the cut-o¤ procedure are outlined in Curtin (1996).
6As far as the socioeconomic groups under scrutiny are concerned, we focus on respondents
classied depending on their gender, income level (low 33% [Y13], middle 33% [Y23] and top
33% [Y33]), educational level (high school or less [EHS], some college degree [ESC] and college
degree [ECD]), age (between 18-34, 35-54, and 55+) and territorial location (east [E], south [S],
north west [NW] and north center [NC]).
2. A Preliminary Look at the Data
This section is devoted to a preliminary inspection of the dynamic pattern of the empirical mo-
ments retrieved from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (MSHE) distribution
of ination expectations. Table 1 reports the time average of the empirical moments of the
MSHE distribution, together with the time average of actual ination for the whole period and
for di¤erent demographic groups.
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 4.28 3.8 20.6 4.44 1.79 8.69
Female 5.37 4.16 34.9 5.55 1.54 5.6
18-34 5.14 4.16 29.5 4.93 1.64 6.52
35-54 4.95 4.09 27.6 4.81 1.72 7.12
55+ 4.48 3.46 28.1 4.9 1.69 6.71
West 4.91 4.09 27.1 4.89 1.61 6.69
North/Centre 4.77 3.9 27.6 4.79 1.73 7.1
North/East 4.82 3.92 28.9 5.09 1.61 6.54
South 4.95 3.94 30.2 4.99 1.66 6.41
Bottom Income Level 5.28 3.95 36.7 5.83 1.44 5.08
Middle Income Level 4.59 3.71 26.8 4.71 1.79 7.36
Top Income Level 4.01 3.57 19.2 4.29 1.9 9.41
HS or less 5.23 3.97 34.8 5.43 1.53 5.47
Some college 4.78 3.96 26.4 4.77 1.66 6.97
College degree 4.51 4.11 20 4.27 1.79 8.95
Overall 4.87 4.16 28.7 5.55 1.73 6.98
4.19
Table 1: Demographic groups and empirical moments (overall sample).
In accordance to the evidence provided by Palmqvist and Strömberg (2004) and Lindén
(2004) for Sweden and Euro area respectively, the mean of male, top level income, highly
educated and elderly individuals is smaller with respect to that of their counterparts within
the same group. As to the median, lower values are associated with elderly and top income
population, while higher values correspond to young and female respondents. Analysis of the
empirical second moment points out that well educated and high income respondents provide
less volatile predictions with respect to other groups. Our evidence conrms the conclusions
advanced by Fishe and Idson (1990), as the degree of dispersion in ination forecasts is smaller
for agents with potentially greater demand for information. However, skewness and kurtosis
seem to be higher for economically more advantaged groups. On average these produce lower
ination forecasts.
7Table 2 focuses on the comparison between the mean and median in terms of prediction
accuracy. We report the sum of squared errors (SSE) for each measure of central tendency. It
is important to mention that the classication based on the income level has started in October
1979. To allow for comparability between groups, we adjust the index for an average error, in
order to account for the time gap. We must bear in mind that, as ination is higher in the rst
part of the overall sample, errors are on average higher. Therefore estimates for these groups
are likely to be downward biased. Furthermore, we perform a robustness check by splitting the
time window into two sub-periods, namely pre- and post-1988. This choice allows us to take
into adequate account the highly inationary period characterizing the rst part of the sample
and the subsequent disination, as it can be observed in Figure 1(a). Table 2 shows that, on
average, the median matches actual ination more closely than the mean. Nonetheless, the
mean is a better predictor compared to the median during the high ination period.
Demographic Group Mean Mean SSE Median Median SSE Inflation
Male 4.28 741 3.8 849
Female 5.37 1474 4.16 1089
18-34 5.14 1143 4.16 900
35-54 4.95 1035 4.09 810
55+ 4.48 1253 3.46 1560
West 4.91 1021 4.09 834
North/Centre 4.77 1021 3.9 1030
North/East 4.82 1115 3.92 1106
South 4.95 1174 3.94 1033
Bottom Income Level 5.28 1610 3.95 772
Middle Income Level 4.59 834 3.71 507
Top Income Level 4.01 431 3.57 392
HS or less 5.23 1420 3.97 1183
Some college 4.78 1012 3.96 980
College degree 4.51 759 4.11 745
Overall 4.87 1015 4.16 1089
4.19
Table 2: Demographic groups, SSEs for mean and median.
The demographic analysis points out that respondents in the top income range are generally
more e¢ cient. Gender and education are also proven to be important determinants for the rise
of heterogeneous forecasts.9 Our data show that, for more biased groups, the mean is a better
predictor compared to the median, and vice versa. This evidence clearly reects in the dynamic
pattern of the skewness. The forecasting performance of some demographic groups is explored
further in the next section, where we consider group-specic ination data.
9We do not deepen the analysis in the case of the regional partition. In this case it would be necessary to take
into account the presence of asymmetric shocks within the US.
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Figures 1(a)-(g): Empirical moments of the MSHE distribution (realized date).
In Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2 report the empirical moments of the MSHE distribution
for the two sub-samples. The analysis shows a lower level of skewness and kurtosis in the rst
part of the sample, while opposite evidence holds for the variance. The characteristic di¤erences
detectable between and within demographic groups generally maintain the same features after
the sample is split in pre- and post-1988.
9Figure 1(a) plots mean and median against actual ination.10 It is evident how both mea-
sures of central tendency constantly underestimate the rise in ination in the rst part of the
sample, although the forecasting performance improves remarkably during the subsequent dis-
ination. This improvement is probably due to the credibility that the Federal Reserve (FED)
acquired in lowering inationary pressures. In the post-1988 subsample, expectations appear to
be quite stable, although they almost systematically fail to match periods of low ination. We
can also observe how expectations do not match the marked rise in price level during the rst
Gulf War, by reacting with a consistent delay. This over-reaction is also present after 9/11, but
with the opposite sign.
Figures 1(b) and 1(c) plot the dynamics of higher empirical moments against cycle and actual
ination. The cross-sectional variance of ination expectations exhibits a marked counter-
cyclical behavior, i.e. it increases during recessions and decreases during booms. Opposite
evidence holds in the case of skewness and kurtosis.11 Moreover, these are fairly stable and low
during the high ination period, while they increase and become more volatile in the second
part of the sample when ination stabilizes (opposite evidence holds for the variance). Higher
kurtosis and higher positive skewness suggest a higher number of outliers in the right tail of the
overall distribution. At a rst glance, a higher number of outliers is at odds with a situation of
stable ination. However, it is important to recall that the opportunity cost of being inattentive,
or relying on a simple forecasting rule (characterized by a lower degree of accuracy), is higher
when ination is high and highly volatile, rather than in periods when ination is kept under
control. In addition, we argue that in periods of stable ination there is less media coverage on
these issues. This drives up the cost of updating information. We further explore this e¤ect in
the remainder as we have data on the share of agents hearing (favorable or unfavorable) news
about prices.
Figure 1(e) plots the mean of the MSHE and the mean forecast of the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) against actual ination. It is striking how the latter, generally more accurate
in the second part of the sample, is more biased than the household survey during the period of
high ination. The two predictions are remarkably similar from 1984 to 1990. From this point
onward, the SPF seems to provide a more accurate prediction.
3. Group-Specific Inflation and Forecasting Performance
This section is designed to assess which measure of ination agents consider when they articu-
late expectations in survey interviews. We evaluate the performance of di¤erent demographic
groups in forecasting one-year ahead ination by alternatively assuming group-specic ination
and overall CPI ination as benchmarks. Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) argue that some agents
might use group-specic ination as a benchmark for their forecasts, and advance this as a
possible explanation of the observed di¤erences in ination expectations across demographic
groups. Data on group-specic ination have only recently been collected for the US, allowing
us to perform a comparative study. Our empirical approach allows us to understand whether
10All the series describing expectational variables are reported at the realised date.
11These results have been conrmed also by regression analysis. See Pfajfar and Santoro (2007).
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individuals might be "fooled" by their own experience when forecasting general CPI ination.
The forecast accuracy of each group is evaluated with respect to the ination rate computed
from group-specic CPIs. Socioeconomic indicators a¤ecting the composition of the consump-
tion basket might play an important role in determining the ination that di¤erent individuals
perceive. As Valev and Carlson (2003) point out, there are two processes that positively a¤ect
the distance between agentsperceived ination and the percentage change in the o¢ cial CPI.
Ination increases by more as the composition of consumer-specic consumption basket diverges
from the overall one, and as the degree of heterogeneity in individual price changes increases.
Although the objective of the Michigan Survey is to collect participantsforecast about changes
in the general price level, we believe that some groups produce responses based on their own
experience. Agents in this groups do not necessarily consider the overall inationary dynamics
when forecasting. This element is especially relevant in periods of stable ination, when agents
do not update their information set or do not hear any news about ination. In such circum-
stances, they necessarily have to rely on their own experience. In the remainder of this section
we test our conjecture about the importance of group-specic ination to explain di¤erences in
the sum of squared errors (SSE) across di¤erent groups.
Relying on the Consumer Expenditure Survey and on item-specic CPI data, McGranahan
and Paulson (2005) calculate monthly chain-weighted ination measures for thirteen di¤erent
demographic groups and for the overall urban population from 1982 to 2005. They show that
ination experiences of di¤erent groups are highly correlated with (and similar in magnitude to)
those of the overall urban population. Nevertheless, the ination rate for the elderly population
is generally higher than the one of the overall urban population. Furthermore, ination volatility
is higher for less advantaged (e.g. elderly, less educated, bottom income level) groups and lower
for more advantaged groups. We argue that this e¤ect might result from higher expenditure
shares on necessities among less educated agents. In fact, prices of these goods are generally
more volatile, especially in the case of food and energy.12
It is worth pointing out that it is not possible to employ the whole dataset provided by
McGranahan and Paulson (2005) due to a di¤erent classication strategy. To make their data
compatible with the classication adopted in the Michigan Survey, it is necessary to transform
some of their series. McGranahan and Paulson (2005) only consider two categories regarding
age, namely elderly and not elderly. In their taxonomy, the elderly population is regarded as
65+. To retrieve an indicator for 55+ CPI ination, we construct a weighted average of the
series for the group-specic ination of elderly and not elderly agents. Weights are computed
by considering the share of population falling in the interval [55, 64] and the overall share of
65+ population, respectively. Data on the demographic structure in the US are obtained from
the US Census. We follow a similar approach to obtain price indices comparable to the ination
expectations of our three income classes. McGranahan and Paulson (2005) compute these series
for each quartile in the per-capita income distribution. By relying on the evolution of the per-
capita income over the period 1981-2004, and in particular on the contribution brought by each
12However, this di¤erence in variability is fairly modest. It is found that ination rate of the least educated is
3.0% more volatile than ination for all urban households.
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quartile in the income terzile, we are able to compute opportune weights for evaluating price
indices for top, middle, and bottom income level individuals.
Table 3 shows that, even in the case of group-specic ination, the median constitutes a
better predictor with respect to the mean. In addition, the 50th percentile always lies above the
actual average ination for every group but the elderly respondents. The median seems to be an
accurate forecast measure for di¤erent groups, especially when agents are classied depending
on their educational level. Table 3 reports the SSE for both predictors with respect to the
general ination (SSEmean; SSEmedian) and to the group-specic ination measure (SSEmean,
SSEmedian).
Mean SSE mean SSE* mean Median SSE median SSE* median Infl
Age 55+ 4.08 587 466 3.07 466 523 3.53
Bottom 5.11 1389 971 3.77 441 413 3.56
Middle 4.33 730 645 3.45 370 350 3.43
Top 3.7 363 445 3.26 295 408 3.4
EHS 4.79 1058 955 3.55 397 415 3.47
ESC 4.23 663 661 3.44 364 441 3.43
ECD 3.89 468 521 3.5 345 460 3.46
Overall 3.23
0.00
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InflTable 3: Group-specic forecasts based on the mean and the median of the MSHE distribution.
As most of the times the median is found to be a better predictor than the mean, we focus on
the description of its predictive power with respect to the general and group-specic ination.
For all the income groups, both SSEmedian and SSEmedian display a declining pattern as the
level of economic advantage increases, i.e. an increasing income level is associated to better
predictions. It is immediate to verify that SSEmedian is lower than SSEmedian for the bottom
and middle income group, while for the top income level SSEmedian is a better predictor. This
signals that wealthy agents are likely to observe the general price level. As to the educational
level, the results for the mean are similar to those observed for income classes. Conversely, in
the case of the median the SSEmedian is always greater than SSEmedian. As the level of social
advantage increases, the forecast accuracy changes in favor of the general index.
A separate digression is in order for the 55+ group. These agentsforecasts are more accurate
if we assume that they observe the general ination. However, this evidence is reversed when
assessing the forecast accuracy for the mean. Overall, the mean produces the lowest SSEs if
we take into consideration the group-specic ination. This is in line with the results obtained
by McGranahan and Paulson (2005). They nd that the eldest group is also the one with the
largest deviation of group-specic ination from overall ination, as their cumulative ination
is 5% higher than the average ination.
Generally speaking, our results point out that socioeconomically less advantaged individuals
are likely to form ination expectations assuming as a reference point their specic consumption
basket. Conversely, more advantaged classes are less concerned with the ination computed from
their specic price index. They also seem to take into consideration overall ination dynamics.
Therefore, as respondents in the Michigan Survey are asked to forecast changes in the "general"
price index, it appears that these agents fully address the question. Even though group-specic
12
ination cannot entirely explain the di¤erences in the accuracy of predictions, it is proven to be
quite important, especially for the bottom income group. Perceived ination can vary markedly
across socioeconomic groups.
In particular, some surveys ask the interviewees to state the actual ination they perceive,
along with ination forecasts. If we assume that agents forecast based on their perceived
ination, we can compare our results, in terms of di¤erence between group-specic and actual
ination, with the evidence retrievable in these surveys.13 It turns out that, our results cannot
account for the whole bias that is generally observed between perceived an actual ination,
albeit it is quite important for less socially advantaged groups. As to the remaining part of the
bias, it is also important to recall that less advantaged groups are likely to be less exposed to
news reports about ination.
4. Asymmetries in the Expectation Formation Process
One of the main tasks of this work is to uncover the mechanism at the root of asymmetries in the
expectation formation process. Previous research has advanced di¤erent explanations. Souleles
(2004) suggests that a wedge between peoples expectations may arise due to group-specic
shocks. Another wide strand of the literature explores the role of information in consumers
behavior. In fact, individuals might gather their information from local or private sources.14
Their information set can be a¤ected by a selection bias if they tend to rely on information
about the specic industry in which they are employed. These elements might give rise to
structural di¤erences in the expectation formation process of respondents located in di¤erent
industrial districts.
McGranahan and Toussaint-Comeau (2006) also show that individuals form their expecta-
tions based on both individual experiences and exposure to news. One of the most important
ndings is that many agents in the sample report having heard no news. Therefore, they are
considerably dependent on their idiosyncratic experiences and perceptions. In general, hearing
no news and having a good past year render respondents more optimistic, while hearing no
news and having a bad year render respondents more pessimistic.
In this section we implement a number of tests based on percentile time series. We aim at
deepening our insight on the informational and operational content of the forecast produced
by individuals with di¤erent socioeconomic background. Output gap, current ination, short
and long term interest rates carry relevant information for the process of ination expectations
formation. To assess the importance of any di¤usion process, we also introduce in the set
of regressors the mean forecast retrievable from the SPF.15 Carroll (2003a, 2003b) designs
an epidemiological framework to describe how respondents to the Michigan Survey form their
expectations. For this purpose, he models the evolution of inationary expectations based on
13For example, Lindén (2004) reports the statistics for perceived ination and ination forecasts in the Euro
area.
14See, for instance, Dunn and Mirzaie (2006).
15This survey is currently conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. From 1968 to 1990 NBER
and ASA were responsible for its conduction. Before 1981 data exist only for GDP deator forecasts. We merge
the two series in order to ll the gap in the rst few years of our sample.
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the assumption that households update their information set from news reports. These reports
are likely to be inuenced by the expectations of professional forecasters. Carroll (2003a, 2003b)
nds that the mean of the MSHE distribution has, on average, a mean square error almost twice
the one of the SPF. Moreover, SPF ination expectations are found to Granger-cause household
ination expectations but household expectations do not seem to Granger-cause professional
forecasts. However, the di¤usion process is slow due to households inattentiveness.16 We
argue that this process exerts an asymmetric e¤ect on households with di¤erent socioeconomic
backgrounds.
Time series of percentiles allows us to capture the degree of heterogeneity in di¤erent regions
of the MSHE distribution. As a rst step we need to derive a distribution of responses. Given
the nature of the data at hand, interpolation is a convenient way to compute the empirical
distribution of responses. As di¤erent interpolation techniques and non-parametric estimations
deliver very similar results, we rely on an empirical density obtained via linear interpolation.
Our methodology is designed to assess the relevance of di¤erent theoretical models proposed in
the literature, but it is also driven by a practical consideration. The pseudo-panel retrievable
from the MSHE is highly unbalanced, as households interviewed change over time. Computing
percentiles for each year allows us to obtain a set of time series that carry information about the
cross-sectional evolution over time. We regard the expected change in price level in the next 12
months as a random variable, denoted by t+12jt. This is assumed to be distributed according
to some continuous distribution, F (). The kth quantile of the distribution, kt+12jt, is the value
below which (100k)% of the distribution lies. Therefore F (kt+12jt) = k. Following this strategy,
we can compute a set of ordered statistics for each month, obtaining 99(= k) time series of
percentiles. Of course, the number of observations in the cross-section varies over time. Given
our sample size, at each cut-o¤, we can be condent that empirical quantiles are good estimates
of the population quantiles. For any two sample ordered statistics kt+12jt and 
k+h
t+12jt, the amount
of probability in the population distribution contained in the interval (kt+12jt ; 
k+h
t+12jt) is a
random variable, which does not depend on F ().
We are aware of the methodological limits implicit in our approach, as the survey is not
conducted on the same agents for the whole time period. In fact, each household is interviewed
only twice. Nevertheless, several empirical (Pfajfar and Santoro, 2007 and Curtin, 2005) and
theoretical studies support the view that agents with similar characteristics tend to behave
similarly. We nd these considerations to be even more appropriate in our case, as we condition
the distribution of responses to the socioeconomic background. As a matter of fact, ination
forecasting is common in every-day life and not just when households are asked to provide
forecasts. Therefore, we can argue that when one respondent is replaced by another with
analogous intrinsic characteristics, his information set is likely to be nested within that of the
newcomer. This argument is in line with the structure of overlapping generation models. Strictly
speaking, we consider a representative agent for each percentile. Therefore our approach does
not allow individuals to switch across percentiles. Branch (2004, 2007) provides some support
16Also Pesaran and Weale (2006) point out that, even if the expectations of professional forecasters were
rational, householdsexpectations would adapt slowly.
14
for time varying degrees of heterogeneity. Although we nd traces of this switching in our data,
it occurs only at a small scale. We acknowledge that these limitations are rather important.
Nevertheless, we think that it is still possible to retrieve some valuable information about the
ination expectation process by exploiting the logitudinal dimension of the data at hand.
4.1. Tests for Rational Expectations. The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) can
be interestingly tested with survey expectations data17 to determine di¤erent degrees of forecast
e¢ ciency. To satisfy the REH, the forecasting procedure should not yield predictable errors. A
test of bias can be applied by regressing the expectation error of each percentile on a constant.18
This allows us to verify whether ination expectations are centred around the right value:
t   ktjt 12 = + "t; (1)
where t is ination at time t and ktjt 12 is the k
th percentile from the MSHE. The following
regression represents a second test for rationality:
t = a+ b
k
tjt 12 + "t; (2)
where rationality implies that conditions a = 0 and b = 1 are jointly satised. Equation (2) can
be simply augmented to test whether available information is fully exploited:
t   ktjt 12 = a+ (b  1)ktjt 12 + "t: (3)
Under the null of rationality, these regressions are meant to have no predictive power.19
4.2. Sticky Information.
Testing for Sticky Information. As explained before, the updating frequency can vary
considerably across di¤erent socioeconomic groups. We estimate a simple regression introduced
in Carroll (2003a), to investigate the relevance of a static sticky information model for the whole
cross-sectional spectrum:
ktjt 12 = 1
s
tjt 12 + (1  1)kt 1jt 13 + "t: (4)
As Carroll (2003a) points out, news about ination spread slowly across agents, reaching only
a fraction 1 of the population in each period. The model is estimated under the assumption
that coe¢ cients sum up to 1, although this restriction is not likely to be satised across all
percentiles.20
17See Pesaran (1987); Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004); and Bakhshi and Yates (1998) for a review of these
tests.
18See, for an application, Jonung and Laidler (1988) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004).
19An alternative test for rationality takes into account that ination and ination expectation data are I(1). The
REH suggests that these series cointegrate, i.e. expectations errors are stationary. Moreover, the cointegrating
vector has no constant terms and the coe¢ cients on expected and actual ination should be equal in absolute
value (Bakhshi and Yates, 1998).
20 It should be pointed out that this model is derived under the following assumptions: (i) ination follows a
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4.3. Estimating Simple Learning Rules. Our analysis then moves on to assess the im-
portance of adaptive behavior. Di¤erent learning rules are considered in order to test whether
agentsexpectations converge toward rational expectations (perfect foresight). For a compre-
hensive discussion on di¤erent learning rules and convergence to rational expectations see Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). The following regression model is equivalent to an adaptive expecta-
tions formula:
ktjt 12 = 
k
t 13jt 25 + #

t 13   kt 13jt 25

+ "t; (5)
where # is the constant gain (CG) parameter. Under this learning rule, agents revise their
expectations according to the error of the last realized forecast. As interviewees are asked to
forecast ination for the next year (hence they make their forecast at time t  12), the revision
will be based on the previous periods forecast, which has been carried out at time t  25.
The following formula represents an adaptive mechanism featuring a decreasing gain (DG)
parameter:
ktjt 12 = 
k
t 13jt 25 +

t

t 13   kt 13jt 25

+ "t: (6)
The empirical approach consists of the estimation of # and . If the estimated parameters
turn out to be signicantly di¤erent from 0, then we could conclude that agents actually update
their forecasts with respect to past mistakes.
Recursive Representation of Simple Learning Rules. The above specications are
designed to test for the existence of adaptive behavior. In the adaptive learning literature, it
is assumed that agents behave like econometricians using all the available information at the
time of the forecast. We now specify a recursive model of adaptive learning. In this version, we
test if agents update their coe¢ cients with respect to the last observed error. We assume that
agents have the following perceived law of motion (PLM):21
stjt 12 = 0;t 1 + 1;t 1t 13 + "t: (7)
When agents estimate their PLM, they exploit all the available information up to period
t  1. As new data become available, they update their estimates according to a constant gain
learning (CGL) rule or a decreasing gain learning (DGL) rule. First, we focus on stochastic
gradient learning and then on least squares learning, both under CG or DG. Let Xt and bt
be the following vectors: Xt =

1 t

and bt =  0;t 1;t 0. When agents rely on
stochastic gradient learning, they update coe¢ cients according to the following rule (see Evans,
Honkapohja and Williams, 2005):
bt = bt 1 + #X 0t 25 t 12  Xt 25bt 13 : (8)
In the updating algorithm for DGL, we just replace # with t .
22 Therefore we nd # and  that
random walk process; (ii) ktjt 13  kt 1jt 13 (see Döpke et al., 2006a).
21 In the remainder of the paper we analyse several di¤erent PLMs.
22This is always the case when applying DGL.
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minimize the sum of squared errors (SSE), i.e.

stjt 12   ktjt 12
2
.
The drawback implicit in this approach is that we have tu assume initial values of bt for 12
periods. When we recursively estimate learning, the main di¢ culty is how to set initial values.
This is extensively discussed in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007). Strictly speaking,
this problem should not occur in our case since we simply try to replicate our time series data
as closely as possible. Thus, we design an exercise in order to search for the best combination of
gain and initial values to match each percentile.23 This strategy can also be regarded as a test
for learning dynamics. If the gain is found to be positive under this method of initialization,
then the series would exhibit learning for all other initialization methods with a higher (or
equal) gain.
4.4. "General" Models of Expectation Formation. We also estimate some more gen-
eral models of expectations formation to consider the macroeconomic factors likely to a¤ect
ination forecast. The rst model investigates which variables agents take into account when
forecasting ination. We also estimate some more general models of expectations formation.
The rst model investigates which variables agents take into account when forecasting ination.
We specify the following percentile regression:
ktjt 12 = +
X
i
it i +
X
i
iyt i + it 24 + rt 24 + 
k
t 1jt 13 + 
F
tjt 12 + "t; (9)
k = 1; :::; 99; i = 12; 14; 24; 30:
We denote with ktjt 12 the k
th percentile of the 12 months ahead expected change in prices,
while Ftjt 12 denotes the mean of the 12 months ahead expected change in prices derived from
the SPF. Furthermore, yt denotes the cycle indicator (detrended industrial production index
[IPI]), t is actual ination, it is the real short term interest rate (3 months t-bill coupon rate),
rt is the long term interest rate (10 years t-bond yield).
In order to capture the determinants of monthly changes in ination expectations, the
following percentile time series regression is specied:
ktjt 12   kt 13jt 25 = +
X
i
i

t i   kt ijt i 12

+
X
j
 j

kt jjt j 12   kt j 12jt j 24

+ Xt + "t; (10)
k = 1; :::; 99; i = 13; 14; j = 1; 2;
Xt =
h
yt it rt (it 1   rt 1) Ftjt 12
i0
where the operator  denotes the di¤erence between the current value of the variable and its
23However, this approach has an obvious practical inconvenience, as running a grid search on several variables
is computationally very intensive.
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lagged (13 periods backwards) counterpart.
To further investigate the nature of the forecast error, we estimate model (11). Evidence of
serial correlation in the forecast error process indicates that there is an ine¢ cient exploitation
of information from last years forecast, thus violating the RE hypothesis. We also include the
SPF forecast error in the set of regressors:
t   ktjt 12 = + 

t 13   kt 13jt 25

+ (t   Ftjt 12) + Xt + "t; (11)
k = 1; :::; 99; Xt =
h
yt t (it   rt)
i0
:
Model (11) is similar to the regression in Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) and in Ball
and Croushore (2003). In their regression, the forecast error is regressed on the levels of the
variables we introduce in the set of regressors. However, our model features past errors and
changes in the relevant regressors as determinants of the current forecast error.
4.5. Results. We rst consider the results for the overall population of respondents. These
constitute a useful benchmark to compare the results obtained for di¤erent demographic groups.
group α=0 (1%) α=0 (5%) a=0,b=1 CGL* CGL peak mCGL coef. DGL* DGL peak mDGL coef.
male 55-58 54-58 never 44-99 75 (37%) 62 (0.50) 42-94 76 (77%) 77 (37)
female 50-53 50-53 never 42-97 71 (34%) 58 (0.37) 43-87 68 (69%) 70 (30)
18-34 51-54 50-54 never 36-97 66 (39%) 55 (0.53) 36-87 68 (72%) 70 (32)
35-54 51-54 51-54 never 40-98 72 (38%) 57 (0.47) 40-92 70 (72%) 72 (33)
55-97 57-60 56-60 never 54-98 78 (27%) 78 (0.35) 52-94 76 (57%) 79 (36)
West 51-54 51-54 never 39-98 62 (39%) 55 (0.56) 39-92 70 (74%) 71 (35)
Nort-centr. 53-56 52-56 never 44-98 76 (30%) 61 (0.40) 44-90 72 (60%) 73 (34)
Northeast 53-56 52-56 never 42-98 64 (34%) 60 (0.50) 43-91 70 (59%) 75 (33)
South 53-55 52-56 never 42-98 73 (35%) 59 (0.40) 43-90 72 (65%) 73 (32)
Bottom 49-52 48-53 never 60-97 71 (26%) 72 (0.29) 17-31, 58-95 67 (50%) 64 (39)
Middle 52-55 51-55 never 48-98 75 (38%) 77 (0.33) 14-33, 57-97 71 (65%) 62 (47)
Top 54-57 53-58 never 50-99 81 (43%) 58 (0.51) 12-34, 54-98 76 (71%) 61 (51)
HS or less 52-55 51-55 never 48-96 73 (30%) 73 (0.31) 47-89 71 (66%) 72 (32)
Some coll. 53-55 52-56 never 40-98 72 (35%) 57 (0.53) 40-91 73 (67%) 74 (33)
Coll. degree 52-54 51-55 never 35-99 64 (43%) 56 (0.60) 35-94 73 (74%) 75 (36)
Overall sample 52-53 51-55 never 44-98 74 (35%) 59 (0.42) 42-90 72 (75%) 73 (33)
* R^2 above 5%
Table 4: Tests for rationality and learning.
It turns out that the most interesting insights arise when respondents are classied depending
on their income level. Therefore, in the remainder we devote particular attention to the inuence
of individualswealth on their process of expectation formation. Table 4 presents the results
from rationality and learning tests. In the rst two columns we report the results of the test
for bias (1), while in the third one we present the results for the second test for rationality,
outlined in equation (3). The next three columns report the results of the test for adaptive
behavior with CG, while the last three columns refer to the same test under DG. Table 4 also
reports the range of percentiles for which the variance of the explanatory variable (past forecast
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error) explains more than 5% of the variance of the dependent variable. In the middle column
we also report the highest R2 and the percentile in correspondence of which this is achieved.
The last column reports the percentile with the highest gain, both under CG and DG, and the
corresponding gain.
It is interesting to outline the results obtained from models (9)-(11).24 These provide impor-
tant information about the information structure underlying the process of expectation forma-
tion. We assess the relevance of each regressor depending on the value of the associated partial
correlation coe¢ cient. The general features outlined for the overall sample are generally pre-
served at a more disaggregated level. Nevertheless, some quantitative di¤erences among groups
can be detected. As mentioned, model (9) aims at explaining how one-year-ahead ination ex-
pectations are made. The model reported in (10) is designed to explain the determinants of the
change in forecasts, whereas model (11) provides a deeper understanding of the determinants of
forecast errors. As to the latter, evidence of serial correlation in the forecast error process indi-
cates an ine¢ cient exploitation of information from last years forecast. This violates the REH.
Our results suggest that agents on the LHS are static or highly autoregressive. The middle
range is characterized by nearly rational agents, while on the RHS of the distribution, agents
behave in accordance with adaptive learning and sticky information. The latter generally react
too pessimistically to changes in contemporaneous ination.
Figures 4(a)-(o) report, for every percentile of each demographic group, the inverse of the
estimated parameter 1 from model (4). This provides us with an estimate of the average
updating period. Generally speaking, our estimates conrm the existence of static behavior
in the information structure up to the 40th percentile for all demographic groups. From this
point up to the 91st percentile, we can detect the presence of a U-shaped pattern of the average
updating frequency, with a minimum occurring around the 50th percentile. For agents in the
middle part of the distribution the average updating period is around 6   12 months. Figures
2(a)-(c) allow for a comparison, in terms of SSEs, between di¤erent demographic groups.
The interviewees of the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior are also asked whether
they have heard of di¤erent favorable or unfavorable changes in business conditions in the past
month. From these data we can also retrieve the percentage of agents that have heard any news
about prices. Special attention has to be paid when interpreting the informational content of
the data on news. In fact, the share of respondents hearing news about business conditions can
be viewed as a proxy for the amount of business information released by the media. Moreover, it
can also be interpreted as an indicator on how agents actually perceive the importance of these
news. Figure 2(a) plots the dynamic path of the ow of favorable and unfavorable news about
prices observed by respondents against actual ination, while Figures 2(b) and 2(c) report the
time average and the variance for each demographic subgroup, respectively. As to the overall
share of agents hearing news about prices, we can observe sudden shifts in periods when ination
abruptly changes, especially to higher levels. On average, 5:2% of agents have heard news about
prices in each month. Nonetheless, signicant di¤erences emerge among the demographic groups
24For the overall sample, these are reported in Appendix B. Results for demographic subgroups are available
upon request from the authors.
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considered in this study.
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Figures 2(a)-(c): Favorable and unfavorable news about prices.
Another question is in order at this stage. Do agents have a di¤erent perception when
hearing news? To address this question, it can be noticed that the level of favorable news
is almost constantly below the level of unfavorable ones. The share of respondents hearing
unfavorable news is far more volatile, displaying a number of peaks in correspondence to sudden
rises in ination. This evidence of asymmetry is in line with the prospect theory advanced by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).25 Furthermore, as expected, the percentage of agents hearing
favorable news is negatively (but weakly) correlated with positive changes in ination while
the evidence is reversed when considering the share of respondents hearing bad news. This
evidence carries an important informational content, as it indicates how agents pay attention to
news about ination mostly during adverse periods, characterized by high and volatile ination.
Conversely, general or specialized media coverage is somewhat disregarded in times of stable
and low ination. Based on German data, Lamla and Rupprecht (2007) disentangle two possible
channels of inuence from media to householdsexpectations. They argue that volume of news
improves the accuracy of forecasts. However, they acknowledge that reports can contain opinions
that are likely to bias householdsexpectations.
Curtin (2005) suggests that less advantaged groups face higher costs of collecting and
processing information. Thus, they less frequently update their information set and they exhibit
greater heterogeneity in forecasts. To study the incentives to gather and process information,
25Curtin (2005) nds similar evidence when comparing the change in ination forecasts between the rst and
second interview in episodes of rising and falling ination.
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the European Commission has designed a survey that collects information about households
future consumption plans (house, car) along with ination expectations. Lindén (2004) shows
that ination expectations of agents that plan to buy a house or a car are lower. Therefore he
argues that incentives to collect information matter when forming expectations.26
The results of the recursive estimation for adaptive learning for the overall sample are
reported in Appendix B. These suggest that agents on the RHS of the distribution tend to
behave in an adaptive manner, whereas agents on the LHS do not exhibit such behavior. In
particular, agents between the 65th and 98th percentile behave in accordance with the CG version
of gradient learning. The estimated gain, plotted in Figure B5, follows a hump-shaped pattern
reaching a peak at 2:1 10 4. This maximum is located between the 71st and 73rd percentile.
The DG version of gradient learning exhibit similar characteristics to CG version. To compare
both versions of gradient learning, we plot their SSEs in Figure B7. Our results suggest that
the CG version of gradient learning generally provides a better description of agentsbehavior,
especially around the 70th percentile.
Orphanides and Williams (2005a) suggest a value of gain coe¢ cient between 0:01 and 0:04,
whereas Milani (2007) obtains an estimate of 0:0183. Relying on experimental data, Pfajfar
and µZakelj (2007) nd that most of the gains are in the range 0:01   0:07. They estimate an
average gain of 0:041 with standard deviation of 0:047: Our estimates are signicantly smaller.
A partial explanation we can point to is that previous estimates are obtained with quarterly
data, while our data have a monthly frequency. An estimate of 0:02 with quarterly data suggests
that agents rely on 12:5 years of data. At the same time, an estimate of 2:110 4 with monthly
data implies that agents roughly use 400 years of data. However, we only regard these estimates
as the lower bound of the gain coe¢ cient.
Gender. The results obtained from the sticky information model suggest that, on aver-
age, women on the RHS update information more frequently than their male counterparts [see
Figures 4(a) and 4(b)]. However, a closer look at the SSEs suggests that this model performs
better for male respondents [see Figure 5(a)]. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show that male respondents
entail both higher average and variance in the perception of favorable and unfavorable news,
compared to the female population. Agents on the RHS are also associated with adaptive be-
havior. On average, a higher proportion of female agents behave in this fashion. Nevertheless,
the gain is usually higher for the male population. The adaptive process better reects male
respondentsforecasts, except for agents up to the 67th percentile [see Figure 3(j)].
As suggested by model (9), current ination accounts for most of the variability in the
forecast of male respondents. The associated coe¢ cient follows a monotonically increasing
pattern up to the 95th percentile. Furthermore, the autoregressive term exerts a greater impact
for men, even at higher percentiles. As to women, actual ination looses importance in favour
of the SPF forecast around the 65th percentile. This evidence signals that women in the upper
end of the distribution may rely less on their own past forecasts. Model (11) shows that mens
26 It is worth pointing out that it is more likely that highly educated and wealthy households are those who
make these investments. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse these results within demographic groups.
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forecast errors on the RHS are better described by changes in actual ination. At the same
time, SPF forecast errors acquire greater importance around the median of the distribution.
The general t of the model is better for men, especially in the RHS.
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Figures 3(a)-(j): Constant Gain learning across demographic groups. Gain parameter (left
panels) and SSE (right panels).
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As there are considerable di¤erences in the forecasting performance of men and women, it
would be helpful to access data on ination experienced by di¤erent genders. These would allow
us to evaluate to what extent these di¤erences can be ascribed to di¤erent ination perceptions.
Jonung (1981) puts forward an argument about di¤erences in the accuracy of ination forecasts
between men and women. He points out that men and women have di¤erent expenditure habits
and that women are usually responsible for day-to-day shopping. As the Food and Beverage
component of the CPI has been rising faster than the overall CPI during the early 1980s, he
argues that this phenomenon is at the root of the observed discrepancies. We assess the relevance
of this explanation in our data. We nd that SSEmedian is lower when we take into account
the Food and Beverage CPI, although this is also the case for men. Otherwise, SSEmean is
always higher if we take into account Food and Beverage CPI. Therefore, we cannot conrm
the conjecture advanced by Jonung (1981). Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) report that there are
di¤erences in the perception of ination between women and men, although these di¤erences
are not high enough to explain the large gap persistently observed in survey data.27 We also
examine other possible explanations. In particular, does the fact that women read newspapers
less often help at describing the observed pattern?28 Overall, this conjecture nds little support
in our data, as women behave less in accordance with the sticky information model. Also Lamla
and Rupprecht (2007) nd that there is little evidence of asymmetries across gender regarding
the impact of media on ination expectations.
Age. The sticky information model suggests that older respondents (55+) update their
information set more regularly than younger respondents (18-34) [see Figures 4(c)-(e)]. Never-
theless, the middle age group (35-54) displays the lowest SSE. Compared to the other subgroups,
medium aged respondents are signicantly more associated with this root of heterogeneity. Fig-
ures 2(b) and 2(c) show that medium aged respondents entail both higher average and variance
in the perception of favorable and unfavorable news compared to younger and older agents.
On the one hand, it is striking how the share of elderly respondents hearing news about prices
is, on average, very low. On the other hand, the share of people within this subgroup hearing
unfavorable news is similar to the one in the younger group. This evidence might signal a higher
degree of pessimism among older respondents. Such an attitude actually shows up in the data
at di¤erent stages of the analysis. A marked di¤erence in the adaptive behavior is detectable
in Figures 3(g) and 3(h), as only agents between the 69th and 88th percentile appear to learn
in the group 55-97. Furthermore, their gains are notably di¤erent from those of the other two
age subgroups. However, young agents learn between the 55th and 99th percentile. From the
65th percentile onward this model performs worse for younger agents compared to other age
subgroups [see Figure 3(h)].
As to the macroeconomic determinants of the process of expectation formation, model (9)
points out a homogeneous impact of ination for younger people in the middle range of responses.
27Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) nd that disagreement in expectations might be due to both di¤erent shopping
habits and to the fact that less women observe o¢ cial statistics compared to men. However, none of these
observations can explain large di¤erences in survey data.
28This fact is generally observed in polls about the demographic structure of newspaper readers.
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This regressor acquires more importance for elderly respondents at higher percentiles. Younger
people also rely less on their autoregressive term and more on the SPF forecast. Overall, there
are many similarities in the explanatory power of these regressors for the rst two classes (18-34,
35-54). Elderly respondentss forecast errors seem to depend less on changes in actual ination
and to be more correlated with the contemporaneous SPF forecast error. This nding can be
due to the fact that US pensions are indexed to ination. Thus, elderly agents are more exposed
to information about actual ination. Here we also take into account that elderly respondents
entail a di¤erent expenditure pattern compared to that of the younger population. As a matter
of fact, they are likely to allocate a higher share of their expenditure on health care. Curtin
(2005) suggests that both the oldest and the youngest subgroup display greater heterogeneity
in forecasts than the middle age subgroup. However, Lamla and Rupprecht (2007) argues that
older population is less exposed to media bias.
Location. Previous empirical studies on the determinants of ination expectations have
posed little or no attention on the role of agents location for their forecasts. One of the
possible objections to this view arises from the possibility that individuals place a consistent
weight on their own experience. For example, Dunn and Mirzaie (2006) calculate manufacturing
employment concentration as a proxy to measure agentsprivate information. They use this
measure to explain regional variations in consumerscondence. They base their analysis on
the conjecture that information about a particular manufacturing sector may be better known
to the local population. For example, layo¤s in a particular industry may be more visible and
have a bigger impact on agents who are closer to the industry itself. These households may
perceive an earlier or even a di¤erent signal of change on which to base their assessments of
future economic trends.
One interesting nding is that agents living in the NE of the US seem to update their
information set more regularly, compared to agents in the rest of the country. This evidence
might constitute a further conrmation of the thesis advanced by Dunn and Mirzaie (2006).
In fact, people located in the manufacturing belt (NE of the US) might be more exposed to
the ow of information about the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, in this case the sticky
information model does not account for the main features of the expectation formation process.
At the same time, the adaptive learning model performs worse in the case of agents from the NE
with respect to other regional subgroups. The gain in the adaptive learning rule seems to follow
similar patterns for all agents on the RHS of their respective distributions [see Figures 3(a) and
3(b)]. Nevertheless, we nd that agents living in the W of the US are more associated with
adaptive learning compared to other subgroups. Within this subgroup, only agents between the
57th and 99th percentile learn.
Models (9)-(11) do not point at any major di¤erence across the US territory. Nevertheless,
as in the test for sticky information, model (9) shows that forecasts produced by NE agents are
more inuenced by the SPF component. Moreover, model (11) shows that the forecast errors
of W and S agents on the RHS are more associated with changes in actual ination.
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Figures 4(a)-(o): Sticky information model across demographic groups.
Income. We recall that responses coded depending on the income classication have been
sampled from 1979 onwards. Therefore results about this group are not entirely comparable
to the ones regarding other socioeconomic categories. Income classication probably represents
the most important demographic characteristic when forecasting ination. This is especially
evident from the analysis of the adaptive learning. Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show that model (7)
delivers a highly heterogeneous picture as we move across income groups. On the one hand, it
appears that a consistent number of agents learn in the least advantaged group. Nonetheless,
within this range the model produces higher SSEs. We argue that low income agents possibly
have to ll a higher gap, in terms of predictive accuracy, before their expectations converge to
unbiased ination forecast. On the other hand, respondents in the highest income group achieve
a higher gain compared to their less economically advantaged counterparts. Furthermore, adap-
tive behavior seems to provide a more reasonable explanation for the behavior of this class of
agents. In fact, within this subgroup, model (7) produces lower SSEs for a wide range of the
distribution on the RHS. Similar evidence arises from the implementation of the sticky informa-
tion model (4) as, on average, low income agents update their information set more frequently
than higher income agents. Nevertheless, they still have "a lot of work" to catch up with the
performance of more advantaged groups [see Figure 3(d)]. Approximately 68% of high income
agents report hearing news about business conditions, while only 44% of the poorer households
report hearing any news about business conditions on average in each quarter. Figures 2(b)
and 2(c) show the emergence of a clear pattern in the average and variance of the share of
agents hearing news about prices. Both moments increase as the level of economic disadvantage
decreases. It is natural to expect that, on average, a higher proportion of wealthy agents hear
news about prices compared to more economically disadvantaged agents. It is interesting to
notice that the volatility increases in the degree of economic advantage. This can conrm the
presence of a rational inattention mechanism at work. In fact, albeit richer interviewees produce
better forecasts, at the same time they tend to adapt quickly to the arrival of new information,
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especially when this signals negative projections about prices.
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Figures 5(a)-(c): Sticky information model across demographic groups (SSE).
Percentile regressions reported in equations (9)-(11) deliver the most interesting results.
In particular, model (11) shows that the top income group entails a considerable degree of
rationality. Moreover, agents classied within this category are possibly even better forecasters
than their professional counterparts in the SPF. In addition, the autoregressive component
gradually loses importance as we move from the bottom income level to the top one. Model
(11) also shows how top income agentsforecast errors are just described by changes in actual
ination after the 70th percentile, while in the middle range these are mainly accounted for by
SPF forecast errors. The area in this range of response follows a clear hump-shaped pattern.
We have to point out that results from (11) for this subgroup are signicantly di¤erent from
those obtained for other groups. High income agents really stand out in their forecasting
performance, and according to Curtin (2005) they exhibit less heterogeneity than other income
groups. These results are probably driven by di¤erences in expenditure patterns across di¤erent
income subgroups. As a matter of fact, poorer households tend to spend a higher proportion
of their income for food and housing. Indeed, in Section 3 we report that especially low income
households might rely on their group-specic ination when forecasting. Richest respondents
also achieve the best t for model (9), meaning that relevant macroeconomic determinants are
exploited in order to produce forecasts.
Education. Results for income and educational groups are usually highly correlated in
demographic studies. However, compared to the evidence reported in the previous section,
conclusions from the analysis based on agents classied in educational subgroups are partly
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reversed. In terms of forecast accuracy, less educated respondents perform signicantly worse
than agents classied in more advantaged groups. Additionally, less educated agents also achieve
lower gains under the adaptive learning scheme. Only agents above the 62nd percentile bahave
in line with adaptive learning [see Figures 3(a) and 3(f)]. Agents with some college education or
with a college degree perform similarly, although more agents seem to learn in the latter class.
On average, agents with some college education are the ones who most frequently update their
information set. Nevertheless, they produce higher SSEs compared to other groups [see Figures
4(f)-4(h) and 5(a)-5(c)]. In addition, 72% of college graduates report hearing news about current
business conditions while only 38% of agents with high school or less education hear this sort
of news in every quarter. We then consider the share of agents hearing news on prices. As for
the case of population grouped depending on the income level, also in this case we can detect
e¤ects correlated with the level of socioeconomic disadvantage.
There are no major di¤erences between the two higher levels of education when analyzing the
general models of expectation formation (9)-(11). As to individuals comprised in the category
High School or Less, we observe how the autoregressive component gains high importance
at higher percentiles. Model (11) clearly shows that the forecast errors of more educated re-
spondents are just described by changes in actual ination after the 70th percentile, while in
the middle range these are mainly accounted for by SPF forecast errors. Generally, one could
argue that agents with higher education might be more interested in ination reports in the
newspapers. Souleles (2004) suggests that less educated agents might be disproportionately
adversely a¤ected during contractionary episodes, while Curtin (2005) advances that the cost
of collecting and processing information declines as education increases. Curtin (2005) also
points out that the average change in ination expectations in the lowest educational subgroup
is almost three times larger than the average one when comparing ination forecasts in the rst
and second interview. This element can be advanced as an explanation of the joint observation
that the least educated agents update their information set quite frequently and that the sticky
information model does not perform well in explaining their expectation formation process.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes new stylized facts about the process of ination expectation formation
across di¤erent socioeconomic subgroups. The interest in this fundamental process arises from
the consideration that di¤erent demographic groups entail di¤erent degrees of access and di¤er-
ent capacities to process the relevant information. Gathering information is generally considered
a costly task, and some agents might be constrained to rely on simpler rules to form their own
predictions about future ination because of their socioeconomic background.
In line with Pfajfar and Santoro (2007), we conrm that, for every socioeconomic group,
agents positioned around the center of the distribution behave in line with the REH and that
agents on the LHS of the median are highly autoregressive. Furthermore, it can be argued that
ination expectations of these left-of-centre agents are stable around some focal points (digit
preference) and that they simply do not observe movements in any of the relevant macroeco-
nomic drivers. In contrast, on the RHS of the distribution, agents are generally too pessimistic
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and usually tend to overpredict actual ination. As noted above, these RHS agentsination
expectations are more consistent with adaptive behavior (learning), although their speed of
learning can vary signicantly. Furthermore, we argue that they exhibit some features pointed
out by recent advances in the macroeconomic and nancial literature on inattentiveness and
rationally heterogeneous expectations models.
Our percentile time series models conrm a signicant degree of asymmetry in the expec-
tation formation process across demographic groups.29 Income, gender and education seem to
be particularly important characteristics when forecasting ination. In particular, high income,
male, and highly educated agents produce lower mean squared errors. Not surprisingly, agents
classied in the less educated and in the bottom income subgroups attain the highest level of
biasedness.
Expectations formed by least educated agents seem to be less compatible with adaptive
learning, which could help them in the future to reduce their bias. Otherwise, the gain para-
meter in adaptive learning is found to be higher for the groups that generally produce higher
forecast errors. Within these subgroups, people on the RHS of the distribution also update
their information set at least as regularly as more advantaged groups. Nevertheless, the sticky
information model might not explain their true underlying forecasting model to the same extent
as for their more advantaged counterparts.
Overall, our evidence seems to point out that socioeconomically less advantaged individuals
are likely to form ination expectations assuming as a reference point their specic consumption
basket, as they achieve a higher predictive accuracy with respect to their group-specic ination.
Conversely, more advantaged classes seem to observe overall ination dynamics when forecasting
ination. This aspect has a clear implication for monetary policy making, especially for central
banks pursuing ination targeting. If this institutions want to maximize the e¤ectiveness of
their monetary policy, the general prescription is to allocate more time for the communication
of the ination target (forecasts). They especially have to make sure that less advantaged
socioeconomic groups understand the qualitative (in terms of composition of the CPI) and the
quantitative features of their objective.
29Similar results have been pointed out in analyses on consumer sentiment indices. McGranahan and Toussaint-
Comeau (2006) highlight signicant di¤erences regarding educational attainment and gender and nd that these
di¤erences are constant over time.
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6. Tables and Figures
Table A1: Demographic groups and empirical moments (pre-1988).
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 5.64 5.05 29.7 5.77 1.41 6.38
Female 6.65 5.15 46.6 7.58 1.18 4.02
18-34 6.78 5.56 40.5 6.48 1.25 4.57
35-54 6.41 5.37 37.8 6.36 1.32 5.19
55+ 5.27 4 37.2 6.37 1.4 5.32
West 6.33 5.4 37.2 6.43 1.26 5.15
North/Centre 6 4.92 37.9 6.39 1.36 5.19
North/East 6.27 5.13 40.3 6.75 1.27 4.69
South 6.18 4.99 40.7 6.58 1.32 4.81
Bottom Income Level 6.12 4.46 48.6 7.8 1.22 4.02
Middle Income Level 5.7 4.6 37.2 6.27 1.46 5.49
Top Income Level 5.28 4.73 28.9 5.7 1.48 6.6
HS or less 6.29 4.77 45.4 7.19 1.25 4.24
Some college 6.08 5.11 35.7 6.18 1.34 5.34
College degree 6.12 5.71 28.2 5.38 1.3 6.19
Overall 6.18 5.15 39.3 7.58 1.33 4.96
6.2
Table A2: Demographic groups and empirical moments (post-1988).
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 3.36 2.94 14.5 3.54 2.05 10.26
Female 4.5 3.49 27 4.17 1.78 6.68
18-34 4.03 3.21 22 3.89 1.91 7.85
35-54 3.95 3.22 20.7 3.76 1.99 8.42
55+ 3.94 3.09 22 3.9 1.88 7.65
West 3.94 3.19 20.3 3.83 1.85 7.74
North/Centre 3.93 3.21 20.6 3.7 1.98 8.39
North/East 3.84 3.09 21.2 3.96 1.84 7.79
South 4.11 3.22 23.1 3.91 1.89 7.5
Bottom Income Level 4.81 3.65 29.9 4.7 1.57 5.69
Middle Income Level 3.95 3.2 20.8 3.82 1.98 8.43
Top Income Level 3.27 2.9 13.6 3.48 2.13 11.02
HS or less 4.51 3.42 27.6 4.24 1.72 6.31
Some college 3.89 3.18 20.1 3.81 1.88 8.08
College degree 3.42 3.03 14.5 3.51 2.12 10.82
Overall 3.98 3.49 21.6 4.17 2.01 8.35
2.98
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7. Appendix B: General models of expectation formation
Table B1: Percentile Time Series Regression - Model 1.
Percentile α Inflation Cycle AR(1) Tbond Rate Adj R2 DW LM
5 -0.095 -0.011 0.105 0.661 -0.006 0.591 1.865 3.419
-1.126 -0.446 3.864 14.812 -0.142
0.000 0.001 0.093 0.502 0.001
20 0.127 0.008 0.039 0.825 -0.011 0.784 2.108 1.241
1.954 0.382 2.238 25.629 -0.361
0.000 0.013 0.024 0.758 -0.008
35 0.414 0.112 0.079 0.692 -0.055 0.811 2.086 10.782
4.119 3.464 3.067 16.277 -1.224
0.000 0.208 0.030 0.631 -0.055
50 0.644 0.142 0.053 0.642 0.029 0.884 2.090 1.600
5.454 4.041 2.100 14.244 0.624
0.000 0.234 0.009 0.614 0.027
65 0.597 0.141 0.014 0.767 -0.002 0.960 2.201 5.630
5.679 4.617 0.725 20.205 -0.064
0.000 0.195 0.001 0.766 -0.002
80 0.830 0.222 -0.018 0.575 0.267 0.926 2.170 20.817
5.356 4.669 -0.495 12.411 3.711
0.000 0.213 -0.001 0.557 0.158
95 4.923 0.310 -0.113 0.379 0.728 0.885 2.073 5.272
10.517 4.296 -1.833 7.054 5.675
0.000 0.216 -0.002 0.352 0.321
first row: coefficient value; second row: t-test; third row: parcial contributions to R2
Table B2: Percentile Time Series Regression - Model 2.
Percentile α ΔInflation AR(1) AR(2) ΔCycle ΔSPF Forecast Adj R2 DW LM
5 0.022 -0.006 0.025 0.050 0.818 -0.014 0.744 2.002 1.547
0.371 -0.559 0.424 2.688 13.819 -0.336
0.000 0.000 0.018 0.055 0.679 -0.003
20 0.080 -0.031 0.083 0.033 0.832 -0.031 0.857 1.959 5.297
2.076 -3.377 1.419 2.818 14.711 -1.080
0.000 0.019 0.066 0.027 0.749 -0.002
35 0.044 -0.030 0.176 0.039 0.721 0.075 0.787 1.988 0.298
0.934 -1.791 2.973 2.302 12.517 1.529
0.000 -0.005 0.131 0.029 0.609 0.026
50 -0.009 -0.016 0.210 0.032 0.733 0.073 0.819 2.037 5.649
-0.258 -0.713 3.508 1.813 12.993 1.407
0.000 -0.008 0.160 0.016 0.633 0.021
65 -0.033 -0.021 0.222 0.011 0.749 0.111 0.892 1.996 4.886
-1.001 -0.930 3.676 0.849 13.373 2.326
0.000 -0.014 0.178 0.005 0.674 0.051
80 0.435 0.181 0.211 0.029 0.553 0.088 0.794 1.906 9.318
3.305 3.656 3.532 1.193 9.566 1.050
0.000 0.155 0.155 0.007 0.457 0.024
95 2.593 0.247 0.204 0.015 0.435 0.206 0.729 2.019 3.854
4.738 4.835 3.605 0.370 7.712 1.665
0.000 0.199 0.150 0.002 0.349 0.033
first row: coefficient value; second row: t-test; third row: parcial contributions to R2
Table B3: Percentile Time Series Regression - Model 3.
34
Percentile α AR(1) Hor. Spread ΔCycle SPF Forcast Err. ΔInflation Adj R2 DW LM
5 0.725 0.831 -0.212 -0.012 0.411 0.569 0.913 0.877 96.006
5.767 31.100 -9.282 -0.350 7.493 9.843
0.000 0.739 0.001 0.001 0.161 0.012
20 0.377 0.882 -0.110 0.039 0.292 0.545 0.878 0.484 177.147
3.598 28.692 -5.047 1.232 6.058 10.199
0.000 0.749 -0.005 -0.004 0.131 0.008
35 0.536 0.714 -0.130 0.055 0.235 0.530 0.737 0.662 141.077
5.703 15.311 -4.847 1.431 3.631 7.897
0.000 0.484 -0.005 -0.007 0.148 0.121
50 0.098 0.213 -0.034 0.060 0.493 0.174 0.620 0.526 168.881
1.984 3.634 -1.333 1.652 6.884 2.503
0.000 0.099 -0.004 -0.014 0.449 0.097
65 -0.888 0.219 -0.006 0.056 0.254 0.428 0.751 0.534 167.783
-14.176 5.284 -0.327 2.103 5.494 10.620
0.000 0.070 -0.001 -0.019 0.268 0.437
80 -1.958 0.236 0.000 0.011 0.057 0.815 0.703 0.884 100.847
-16.617 6.523 -0.003 0.252 1.076 17.487
0.000 0.047 0.000 -0.003 0.033 0.630
95 -7.060 0.326 0.047 0.108 -0.321 1.240 0.619 1.112 67.128
-16.674 8.625 1.007 1.583 -3.972 17.933
0.000 0.115 0.005 -0.011 -0.087 0.603
first row: coefficient value; second row: t-test; third row: parcial contributions to R2
Figure B1: Percentile Time Series Regression - Model 1 (Partial R2).
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Figure B2: Percentiles Time Series Regression - Model 2 (Partial R2).
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Figure B3: Percentiles Time Series Regression - Model 3 (Partial R2).
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Figure B4: Percentiles Time Series Regression - Model 3: High Income subgroup (Partial R2).
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Figures B5 and B6: First model with recursive representation-CGL (left) and DGL (right)
(PLM only considers current ination).
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Figure B7: First model with recursive representation-comparison between CGL and DGL
(PLM only considers current ination).
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